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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to Section 78-2-2(4) of the Utah Code Annot., 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issue is presented for review by this Court: 1) 
whether the trial court erred when it entered default judgment when 
an answer was already on file; 2) did the trial court abuse its 
discretion in refusing to set aside a default judgment entered when 
the court mistakenly believed that no answer was on file, when, in 
fact, there was an answer on file with the trial court. 
These issues were preserved for appeal in the trial court. 
(See R. 160-169.) 
The standard of review for the first issue is a question of 
law for which this Court grants the trial court no defference. 
(See Klinger v. Knightly, 791 P.2d 868 (Utah 1990.) The standard 
of review for the second issue is that the Court of Appeals will 
reverse the trial court where, as here, there has been a clear 
abuse of discretion. (See Gardiner v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 
1982.) 
v 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55; Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b) . 
vi 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an attempt by Janet Robins to have herself 
declared the common law spouse of Dennis L. Mitchell, a deceased 
person. Janet Robins wishes to obtain a judicial declaration that 
she is the common law spouse of Dennis Mitchell so that, for among 
other reasons, she might be considered a "heir" under Utah's 
Wrongful Death statute. Ms. Robins wishes to be declared an heir 
so that she might maintain a wrongful death lawsuit against 
intervener, Harrington Trucking, Inc. 
Pursuant to that goal, Ms. Mitchell in February, 1998 filed a 
verified petition for judicial declaration of common law marriage. 
In March, 1998, Harrington Trucking moved to intervene in the case 
pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Ms. Robins objected to the intervention. On or about April 7, 
1998, Scott W. Christensen, attorney for Harrington Trucking filed 
an Answer. Said Answer was signed and contained a valid 
certificate of service indicating that it had been mailed to all 
relevant parties. 
On or about May 15, 1998, Harrington Trucking's motion to 
intervene came before Commissioner Thomas Arnett. Commissioner 
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Arnett ruled that Harrington Trucking be allowed to intervene to 
challenge the validity of the alleged marriage between Ms. Robins 
and Dennis Mitchell. 
Ms. Robins appealed the Commissioner's recommendation to Judge 
Anne Stirba who upheld Commissioner Arnett's recommendation by 
Minute Entry on or about September 18, 1998. 
In that order, Judge Stirba instructed the parties to complete 
discovery by October 19, 1998 and for Harrington Trucking to file 
an Answer by October 22, 1998. Judge Stirba's order apparently 
ignores the fact that an Answer had been filed on April 7, 1998. 
On or about October 28, 1998, Ms. Robins filed a certificate 
of default judgment. However, the certificate of default judgment 
was not signed by Judge Stirba, the judge assigned to the case, but 
rather was signed by Judge William Bohling, who presumably is not 
familiar with the facts of the case or that an Answer had been 
filed on April 7, 1998. 
Immediately, Harrington Trucking filed a motion to set aside 
the default judgment. In fact, the motion to set aside any default 
judgment or declaration or common law marriage entered in the case 
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appears on the court's docket and it the record before the default 
j udgment. 
Commissioner Arnett again heard the motion to set aside the 
default judgment and recommended that it be granted. Ms. Robins 
appealed the Commissioner's ruling and Judge Paul Maughn, again not 
Judge Stirba who was assigned to handle the case, decided against 
allowing the default judgment to be set aside despite the fact that 
it was brought to his attention that an Answer had been filed 
before default judgment was entered. 
A. Relevant Facts. 
1. This case arises out of a petition for declaration of 
common law marriage filed by Ms. Robins. (R. 1-4.) 
2. Ms. Robins asserts that she was the common law spouse of 
a person now deceased, Dennis L. Mitchell. (R. 2.) 
3. On or about March 24, 1998, Harrington Trucking moved to 
intervene as a defendant in this case to challenge the validity of 
the alleged common law marriage relationship between Dennis 
Mitchell and Janet Robins. (R. 38.) 
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4. Janet Robins filed an objection to Harrington Trucking's 
motion to intervene as a defendant on or about April 1, 1998. (R. 
45.) 
5. On April 7, 1998, Harrington Trucking filed a reply 
memorandum in support of its motion to intervene. (R. 58.) 
Harrington Trucking also filed, at that time, a separate objection 
or Answer to Ms. Robins7 petition for declaration of common law 
marriage. (R. 55-57.) 
6. On or about May 15, 1998, Commissioner Thomas Arnett heard 
oral arguments on Harrington Trucking's motion to intervene. (R. 
91.) 
7. Commissioner Arnett recommended that Harrington Trucking's 
motion to intervene be granted. (R. 94.) 
8. On or about May 26, 1998, Ms. Robins filed an objection to 
Commissioner Arnett's recommendation. (R. 95.) 
9. On September 18, 1998, Judge Anne Stirba heard oral 
arguments on Harrington Trucking's motion to intervene. (R. 105.) 
10. Judge Striba's order requires that discovery be completed 
by October 19, 1998 and that an Answer be filed by October 22, 
4 
1998. It further orders that an evidentiary hearing be held on 
November 12, 1998. (R. 117-118.) 
11. Judge Stirba's order makes no reference to the Answer 
already filed by Harrington Trucking on April 7, 1998. (R. 117-
118.) 
12. On or about October 28, 1998, Ms. Robins filed a default 
certificate signed by Judge Bohling. (R. 132-134.) 
13. However, at the time, Judge Stirba was still assigned to 
the case. (R. 132.) 
14. There is no indication from the record that Judge Bohling 
considered the Answer already on file since April 7, 1998 in his 
decision to sign the default certificate. (R. 132-134.) 
15. Also on October 28, 1998, in fact before the default 
certificate was entered into the court docket, Harrington Trucking 
filed a motion to set aside any default judgment or declaration of 
common law marriage entered in this case. (R. 123.) 
16. On or about December 16, 1998, Commissioner Arnett heard 
Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside default judgment. (R. 
238.) 
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17. Commissioner Arnett ordered that the default judgment be 
set aside. (R. 241.) 
18. On that same day, Judge Paul Maughn heard Ms. Robins' 
objection to Commissioner Arnett's report and recommendation. (R. 
251.) 
19. Commissioner Maughn refused to set aside the default 
judgment even though it was brought to his attention that an Answer 
had been on file since April 7, 1998. (R. 253.) 
20. In fact, at the time Judge Maughn made his ruling, Judge 
Stirba was still assigned to this case. (R. 254.) 
21. From Judge Paul Maughn's order denying Harrington 
Trucking's motion to set aside default judgment, Harrington 
Trucking now appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Default judgment was entered in this case under Rule 55 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, Rule 55 does not allow 
default judgment to be entered unless an Answer is not on file. 
Because an Answer had been on file since April 7, 1998, it was 
inappropriate for Judge Bohling to enter a default judgment. 
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Furthermore, the trial court erred in refusing to set aside 
the default judgment even though it was informed that an Answer was 
on file. The trial court abused its discretion under Rules 60(a) 
&(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when it failed to grant 
Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside default judgment. 
Therefore, this Court should rule that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to set aside default judgment when an Answer 
was on file and remand this case for a hearing on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
BECAUSE HARRINGTON TRUCKING FILED AN 
APPROPRIATE ANSWER ON APRIL 7, 1998, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENTERED DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF JANET ROBINS. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 55 states, in pertinent part: 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a 
judgment for affirmative relief is sought has 
failed to plead or otherwise defend as 
provided by these rules and that fact is made 
to appear the clerk shall enter his default. 
Therefore, the plain meaning of the terms of Rule 55, default 
judgment may not be entered unless and until it is shown that the 
opposing party has failed to plead or otherwise defend the claim. 
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In this case, on April 7, 1998, Harrington Trucking filed an Answer 
or objection to Janet Robins' petition for a declaration of common 
law marriage. Therefore, it was improper for the court to enter a 
default judgment in the first instance. 
As a preliminary matter, the interpretation of Rule 55 is a 
question of law. See Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 
P.2d 228, 231 (Utah 1998); Thiele v. Anderson, 975 P.2d 481 (Utah 
App. 1999); Goldberg v. J. Timmons & Assoc, 896 P.2d 1241, 1242 
(Utah App. 1995) (each holding that the interpretation of a Rule of 
Civil Procedure is a legal question.) Because interpretation of 
Rule 55 is a legal question, whether default judgment should have 
been entered in this case is also a question of law reviewed under 
a correctness standard. See Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1055 
(Utah App. 1995). Therefore, no defference is given to the trial 
court's decision. See Thiele v. Anderson, 975 P.2d 481 (Utah App. 
1999). 
Under the facts of this case, it is clear that the trial court 
erred in granting default judgment. Under the plain language of 
Rule 55, a trial court cannot grant a default when an Answer is on 
file. See Reese v. Proppe, 3 Ohio App. 3rd 103 (1981) (holding that 
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"once a defendant has Answered the plaintiff's complaint and 
contested the allegations therein, no default judgment may entered 
against that defendant.") 
A. Judge Stirba's Minute Entry Order of 
September 18. 1998 Does Not Alter the Fact 
that an Answer was on File, 
Judge Stirba ordered that an Answer be filed on or before 
October 22, 1998. Harrington Trucking complied with that order by 
having already on file an Answer since April 7, 1998. 
However, Harrington Trucking anticipates that Janet Robins's 
counsel will argue that Harrington Trucking violated Judge Stirba's 
order by failing to file an additional Answer by October 22, 1998. 
However, this potential argument is without merit under the 
circumstances of this case. A transcript of the hearing before 
Judge Stirba which was held on September 18, 1998 and out of which 
the minute entry arose, is part of the record on this case. A 
review of that transcript indicates that the court was not informed 
by either counsel for Ms. Robins or Harrington Trucking that an 
Answer had in fact been filed. In fact, there appears to have been 
some misunderstanding regarding whether or not an Answer had been 
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filed at all. Counsel for Ms. Robins stated during the hearing 
that no Answer had been filed: 
We're now nine months down the road from the time 
the petition was originally filed. It well and truly is 
in default at this point, there's been no pleading filed 
in opposition to it and-and that would allow us to get 
down the road. 
(Emphasis added.)(R.295 pg. 3.)1 
Later, plaintiff's counsel again indicated to the court that 
an Answer had not been filed. 
I-I-and so, but I mean, Harrington 
Trucking may be in a dilemma, but by this 
point, they should have been able to do some 
investigation and be able to tell us what it 
is they contest and thev haven't filed a 
single pleading and that's required by the 
rule. 
(Emphasis added.)(R. 295 pg. 4.) 
Finally, the court ordered as follows: 
Harrington Trucking in no way wishes to insinuate that 
plaintiff's counsel was misrepresenting facts to the trial court. 
It appears from the record that there was a genuine 
misunderstanding about whether or not an Answer had been filed at 
the September 18, 1998 hearing. In fact, Harrington Trucking's 
counsel did not correct Janet Robins' counsel's misunderstanding 
about the fact that an Answer had been filed. Counsel for 
Harrington Trucking who attended the hearing was a substitute 
counsel who was unfamiliar with the case and was not aware that an 
Answer had been filed. 
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And then-and then there must-at that 
point, I would say an Answer to the petition 
if one is intended to be filed should be filed 
on or before the 22nd of October so you know 
exactly what any claims are. 
(R. 295 pg. 16.) 
This dialogue clearly indicates that counsel for Janet Robins, 
Harrington trucking and the Trial Court did not understand that an 
Answer had in fact been filed. However, regardless of what the 
trial court and counsel might have believed, the fact remains that 
an Answer was, in fact, on file. Therefore, under Rule 55, it was 
inappropriate to enter default judgment. 
POINT II. 
SINCE THERE WAS AN ANSWER ON FILE, DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED IMPROPERLY AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in 
pert inent part, 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes 
in judgments, orders, or other parts of the 
record and errors therein arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time of its own initiative or on 
the motion of any party and after such notice, 
if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the 
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appellate court, and thereafter while the 
appeal is pending may be so corrected with 
leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes, inadvertence; excusable 
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the j udgment. 
There are at least two bases under Rule 60 for setting aside 
the default judgment in this case. First, under Rule 60(a), the 
entry of default judgment was made based upon a clerical error, 
i.e., that an Answer was not in fact on file. Rule 60(a) 
specifically allows the court, at any time, or the appellate court, 
at any time, to correct such errors on their own initiative or by 
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motion. In this case, correction of the clerical error of entry of 
default judgment is clearly warranted. 
Second, the default judgment may also be set aside under Rule 
60(b) (1) for reason of mistake. Clearly, there was a mistake made 
in this case. Janet Robins and Harrington Trucking's counsel 
should have indicated to the trial court at the September 18, 1998 
hearing that an Answer was on file. The trial court should have 
discovered that an Answer was on file. These mistakes culminated 
in the entry of a default judgment where none was warranted. Given 
the timeliness of Harrington Trucking's motion, the trial court 
should have set aside the default judgment. 
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it 
failed to set aside the default judgment entered against Harrington 
Trucking. 
POINT III 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THIS COURT FINDS THAT 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED APPROPRIATELY, 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE SET ASIDE THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT. 
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(b) Mistakes, inadvertence; excusable 
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, 
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are 
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just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; .... 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's failure to set 
aside a default judgment under an abuse of discretion standard. 
See Gardiner v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982) . In this case, 
there has been a clear abuse of discretion because the trial court 
failed to set aside default judgment under Rule 60(b). 
The policy of the law is clear. Default judgments are 
extremely disfavored by courts because they rob the litigants' of 
a trial on the merits. According to the Utah Supreme Court: 
It is not to be questioned that in appropriate 
circumstances default judgments are justified; 
and where they are, they are invulnerable to 
attack. However, they are not favored in the 
law, especially where the party has timely 
responded with challenging pleadings. When 
that has been done some caution should be 
observed to see that the party is not taken 
advantage of. Speaking generally about such 
problems, it is to be kept in mind that access 
to the courts for the protection of rights and 
the settlement of disputes is one of the most 
important factors in the maintenance of a 
peaceable and well ordered society. 
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The uniformly acknowledged policy of the law 
is to accord litigants the opportunity for a 
hearing on the merits, where that can be done 
without serious injustice to the other party. 
To that end the courts are generally indulgent 
towards the setting aside of default judgments 
where there is a reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendants failure to appear, 
and where timely application is made to set it 
aside. Consistent with the objective just 
stated, where there is doubt about whether a 
default should be set aside, the doubt should 
be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end 
that each party may have an opportunity to 
present his side of the controversy and that 
there be a resolution in accordance with law 
and justice. 
Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agolla Development Corp.,611 P.2d 
369, 371 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). 
The rules regarding excusable neglect have been elaborated on 
by the Utah Supreme Court. According to the Utah Supreme Court: 
In order for defendant to be relieved from the 
default judgment, he must not only show that 
the judgment was entered against for excusable 
neglect (or any other reason specified under 
Rule 60 (b) ) , but he must also show that his 
motion to set aside the judgment was timely, 
and that he has a meritorious defense to the 
action. 
Erickson v. Schenkers Intntl Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 
1994) . 
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In this case, there is no dispute that the motion to set aside 
the default judgment was timely. In fact, the motion to set aside 
the default judgment appears on the docket before the actual 
default certificate. This fact indicates that the motion to set 
aside any default judgment was filed before the signed default 
certificate. 
Furthermore, there is no question that Harrington Trucking has 
a meritorious defense to this action. Included in the record 
attached to Harrington Trucking's reply memorandum in support of 
its motion to set aside default judgment or declaration of common 
law marriage are subpoenas and other records which indicate that 
there is a meritorious defense to this action. In any event, the 
trial court did not base its decision to deny Harrington Trucking's 
motion to set aside default judgment on the grounds that Harrington 
Trucking did not have a meritorious defense to the action. Rather, 
the trial court believed that Harrington Trucking failed to show 
excusable neglect. (R. 255.) 
This case involved an extremely tight discovery schedule. 
Pursuant to that discovery schedule, Harrington Trucking attempted 
with great diligence to conduct a great amount of discovery in a 
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very short period of time. Harrington Trucking was largely 
successful in that pursuit. In fact, Harrington Trucking was so 
successful that it found substantial evidence which would suggest 
that Ms. Robins' petition for a declaration of common law marriage 
is without merit. 
Furthermore, the record was clear that valid Answer was on 
file which obviated the need to file a second Answer. Clearly, 
under these circumstances, excusable neglect exists because it was 
reasonable for Harrington Trucking to believe that it had complied 
with all of the requirements under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure when it filed its original Answer in April 1998. 
Under these circumstances, the court clearly abused its 
discretion in failing to set aside default judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, Harrington Trucking 
respectfully requests this court to reverse Judge Maughn's decision 
to deny Harrington Trucking's motion to set aside default judgment, 
set aside the default judgment and remand this case for a hearing 
on the merits. 
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DATED this day of August, 1998. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN, WALLACE & KANELL 
&feU£ Od 
SCOTT W.^CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Attorneys for Janet Robins: 
James A. Mclntyre, Esq. 
McINTYRE Sc GOLDEN 
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Attorneys for Lindsev Mitchell: 
Mark A. Larsen, Esq. 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Attorneys for Arlene Greco: 
James R. Boud, Esq. 
ASHTON, BROUNBERGER & BOUD 
765 East 9000 South, Ste. A-l 
Sandy, UT 84 094 
Attorneys for Rebecca Colonna: 
David E. Sloan, Esq. 
Kevin L. Jones, Esq. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Ste. 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
98-085D 
G: \ALL\JASON\MITdHELL\BRIEF 
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ADDENDUM 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS L MITCHELL Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
Plaintiff 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No: 984901224 CL 
Judge: PAUL G MAUGHAN 
Date: December 16, 1998 
Clerk: marcyt 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): JANET ROBINS MITCHELL 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES A. MCINTYRE 
Attorney for the Intervenor: JASON M KERR 
Video 
Tape Number: 11:41 
HEARING 
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for oral argument 
on objection to commissioner's recommendation. The Court hears 
argument from respective counsel and overrules the commissioner's 
recommendation. The default judgment previously entered is 
reinstated. Mr. Mclntyre is instructed to prepare an order 
consistent with the Court's ruling. 
Page 1 (last) 
JAMES A. McINTYRE - 2196 
McINTYRE & GOLDEN, L.C. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-3399 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In re: The Marriage of: I ORDER ON PETITIONER'S 
I OBJECTION TO COMMISSIONER'S 
DENNIS L. MITCHELL and I RECOMMENDATION 
JANET ROBINS MITCHELL. | 
1
 Civil No. 984901224 
' Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing on 
Petitioner's Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation on December 
16, 1998, at the hour of 11:30 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Paul 
G. Maughan. Petitioner, Janet Robins Mitchell, was present and 
represented by counsel, James A. Mclntyre, of and for Mclntyre & 
Golden, L.C. Intervenor Harrington Trucking's counsel, Jason Kerr, 
was also present. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings on 
file, and after hearing the arguments of counsel, and good cause 
appearing therefore, makes the following findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court's Minutes, Oral Argument, Notice signed and 
F ,
T
L
" ° 'S™CT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
entered by Judge Anne M. Stirba on September 18th, 1998, required 
Intervenor, Harrington Trucking, to file an Answer, if they were 
going to, by October 22, 1998, which was 41 days from the date of 
the Minutes, Oral Argument, Notice. 
2. Because of the items set forth above as well as the 
additional length of time to answer Petitioner's Petition for 
Declaration of Common Law Marriage and the shortened discovery 
schedule, Harrington Trucking was, if anything, on heightened 
awareness of the time critical nature of these proceedings and that 
they were to answer because of the specificity of the Minutes, Oral 
Argument, Notice. The Motion to Set Aside may have been timely and 
there may have been cause, but Harrington's neglect was not 
excusable under these circumstances. 
3. The provisions of Rule 60(b) do address the issue of 
prejudice. 
4. The jurisdictional nature of the statute which says 
common law marriage must be established within one (1) year and 
that time is running and because of the schedule of the Court and 
the schedule of counsel, this case cannot be tried without undue 
hardship and prejudice to Petitioner. 
5. Harrington Trucking may have other means for obtaining 
relief. 
6. Because this decision may have an impact, (even if it may 
have an adverse effect) is not sufficient grounds to outweigh the 
2 
^35 
actual prejudice that will be sustained by the Petitioner in this 
action if the Commissioner's recommendation is sustained. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett's recommendation that 
Intervenor Harrington Trucking's default be set aside, should be 
reversed. 
2. Intervenor, Harrington Trucking's default and 
Petitioner's Default Judgment & Judicial Declaration of Common Law 
Marriage should be reinstated 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
1. Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett's recommendation that 
Intervenor Harrington Trucking's default be set aside, is reversed. 
2. Intervenor, Harrington Trucking's default is reinstated 
along with Petitioner's Default Judgment & Judicial Declaration of 
Common Law Marriage. A 
DATED this / / day of Aj^UJi^ 19 ?f . 
BY THE COURT: ^C^£^P?S 
HONORABLE PAUL 
District Court 
Approved as to form: 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANEL, P.C. 
JASON KERR 
Attorneys for Harrington Trucking 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. I appreciate 
3 your willingness to come here on such short time. I hope 
4 you appreciate the Court's willingness as well. 
5 Would you state your appearances for the record, 
6 please. 
7 MR. MCINTYRE: Your Honor, James Mclntyre for 
8 Janet Robins Mitchell, the petitioner in this matter. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. 
10 MR. KERR: Jason Kerr, for intervenor Harrington 
11 Trucking. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kerr. 
13 So you?ve had an order today, a recommended— is 
14 I it an order or recommendation? 
15 MR. MCINTYRE: The way that this procedure 
16 I normally works, your Honor, is that the Commissioner makes a 
17 recommendation, there is an objection filed, which— 
18 THE COURT: Right, which puts it before— 
19 MR. MCINTYRE: Which puts it before you, and so 
20 it's not yet an order of the Court. Although, once it!s 
21 announced, it becomes an order of the Court during the 
22 interim. 
23 THE COURT: Until it's changed, that's right. 
24 MR. MCINTYRE: Right. 
25 THE COURT: So you want to— 
1 time on the 18th and I may have some time on the 28th. But 
2 the problem is we also have witnesses that we have to get 
3 together. 
4 We've now shifted the burden from Harrington 
5 Trucking to set aside the default, we've shifted the burden 
6 back to Janet Mitchell on an extremely abbreviated basis. 
7 THE COURT: Let me ask this question. Why was the 
8 J trial— or the hearing set in November, why wasn't that 
9 addressed sooner than today? It was struck on the default, 
10 but what's happened between— 
11 MR. MCINTYRE: Not a thing. Why it was ever 
12 scheduled in front of the commissioner instead of the Court, 
13 that's a jurisdictional question that I haven't even got 
14 into. But, quite frankly, I don't know how the commissioner 
15 has jurisdiction over this matter. This is not one of those 
16 matters that the— that the rules allow the commissioner to 
17 have jurisdiction over. The commissioner's jurisdiction is 
18 limited to divorces, adoptions, paternity actions, those 
19 sorts of things. But declarations of marriage are not one 
20 of the things that commissioners have jurisdiction over. 
21 I don't believe— I don't know this for a fact, 
22 I but my belief is a commissioner cannot marry someone unless 
23 they happen to be a marriage commissioner authorized by the 
24 clerk of the Court. I don't know. I haven't researched 
25 that issue, but it certainly is an issue. I thought a 
1 claims and defenses, any delay or unfairness in the party's 
2 conduct, the need for finality of judgments and the 
3 respective hardships in denying or granting relief." I 
4 think the hardship in this case in granting the motion to 
5 set aside the default judgment is we1re faced with a 
6 jurisdictional problem here. I believe that this Court 
7 loses jurisdiction to determine that there's a valid 
8 marriage on the 29th of December. I just don!t think— I 
9 think the case lot is clear, I donft think that there's any 
10 choice in that matter. 
11 There is a prejudice to the petitioner if the 
12 default judgment is set aside, that is the ultimate 
13 prejudice. Her marriage can never be declared valid if it's 
14 not done by the 29th.of December. We are in the dilemma of 
15 having to prepare in very short order for a trial that we 
16 didn't think was going to happen. The reason we didn't 
17 think there was going to be a trial was because the Court 
18 had already entered an order declaring that the marriage was 
19 valid. 
20 And, frankly, the time that's available for both 
21 the Court's calendar and for my calendar is extremely short. 
22 I don't mean to— maybe this isn't a good reason, but it's a 
23 practical reason. I have other clients that I have to 
24 represent. I have to take my time to be prepared for their 
25 I cases and I have their cases already scheduled and have been 
i for a long time. This case was scheduled to be tried in 
2 November. It wasn't tried in November because Harrington 
3 Trucking defaulted. 
4 Their default— they are now saying, Well, that's 
5 excusable, we have good reasons for making the default. 
6 Even assume that that's all true, there is no bad conduct--
7 or there is no conduct on the part of the petitioner that in 
8 any way kept them from coming back before Judge Stirba long 
9 before the 12th of November. 
10 If they wanted to set aside, why didn't they come 
11 in and say, Let's have a hearing on whether or not this 
12 ought to be set aside so that we can still have our hearing 
13 on November 12th. That was never done. They wait until the 
14 15th of December and. say, Poor me, poor me. I need to have 
15 the Court accommodate our failure to diligently pursue the 
16 remedy we asked for. We asked for intervention. We've been 
17 allowed by the Court to intervene, but we failed to 
18 contravene any of the allegations until the 28th, after the 
19 default had been entered. 
20 So that's the reason that I believe it is 
21 absolutely unfair and prejudicial to my client and that's 
22 why— and I very much appreciate the Court accommodating us 
23 on what is admittedly very short notice. 
24 THE COURT: I have one procedural question. In 
25 the file the intervenor does say, in effect, we1re not sure 
1 MR. KERR: First, just to clarify one issue, the 
2 hearing on November 12th, I believe was to be before 
3 Judge Stirba. Okay. Now, let me-- I'd like to back up a 
4 little bit and talk to the Court about what actually 
5 happened and led up to this default judgment. 
6 I The motion to intervene was filed way back in 
7 April, I believe. Let me double-check that. Excuse me. 
8 March 24th, 1998. In April— on April 7th of 1998, 
9 Harrington Trucking, as the Court noticed, filed an 
10 objection to the petition for declaration of common law 
11 marriage. And attached to that, the memorandum in support 
12 thereof, was what was an answer. Again, we didn't know in 
13 April or May or June or July whether or not we could even 
14 file an answer. Rule 24, under which we made the 
15 intervention, makes no mention of filing an answer. We 
16 didn't even know, up until the Court's order in October, 
17 that we could even file an answer. 
18 What happened was we were under an extremely 
19 abbreviated time schedule. 
20 THE COURT: Let's stop right there for a minute. 
21 You say that you didn't know you could file an answer or you 
22 didn't understand the rules or the procedures that were— 
23 MR. KERR: It was unclear because our motion to 
24 intervene and our— really wasn't effectively granted, my 
25 understanding, until October. That was my understanding, 
1 because the report and recommendation had been objected tc. 
2 And it wasn't clear to anyone, I don't think, that we needed 
3 to file an answer until October-- until the October order 
4 when the judge specifically stated, You need to file an— 
5 you need to file an answer on this date. Okay. 
6 But way back in April we'd sort of foreseen this 
7 problem and said, Okay, if something comes up, if additional 
8 pleading is necessary, we're going to attach this, this will 
9 serve as our answer. The Court will note that the Answer— 
10 the Supplementary Answer we filed on the 28th of October is 
11 essentially the same, it's in the form of a general denial. 
12 So the argument that they didn't have notice that— what we 
13 would be objecting to really is without merit. 
14 THE COURT:. But the fact is you were ordered to do 
15 an answer, not— 
16 MR. KERR: That's correct. 
17 THE COURT: You couldn't rely on what you'd 
18 already filed. 
19 MR. KERR: Well, I don't know. See, my 
20 understanding— 
21 THE COURT: The Court's order was to file an 
22 answer. 
23 MR. KERR: Right. Let me back up a little bit 
24 too. The attorney who was present on the October hearing— 
25 MR. MCINTYRE: It's September. 
1 MR. KERR: I'm sorry. September. The September 
2 hearing was Mr. Williams from our office. Mr. Christensen 
3 is the lead attorney on the case. Mr. Christensen filed all 
4 the pleadings. I don't know if Mr. Williams was aware of 
5 Exhibit D. Okay. I don't know if he knew at the time. I 
6 don't know what went on there at that hearing so I can't 
7 tell you, but all I know is what's in the Court's order. 
8 On to the issue of the abbreviated time schedule, 
9 we have interviewed several witnesses on our own, we've done 
10 some informal discovery. Their— plaintiff's counsel has 
11 been very kind in trying to— was very kind in trying to 
12 work it out and we did work out most of the discovery 
13 issues. There was a delay, however, because there was some 
14 objections to what materials would be going to certain 
15 parties. And we sent a letter saying that we wouldn't 
16 reveal certain materials we got directly from the plaintiff 
17 to other parties. Once he got that letter, then he turned 
18 over the documents. But there was some confusion there. 
19 Furthermore, given the tight, tight schedule that 
20 J we were under, it just— it was simply excusable neglect, it 
21 was inadvertence, as the rule specifically states. Now, 
22 Rule 60(b), as the petitioner's counsel has correctly 
23 indicated, states that— there are three requirements under 
24 Rule 60(b) for granting a motion to set aside default 
25 judgement. 
1 Do you mind if I take this? 
2 MR. MCINTYRE: Oh, no, not at all. 
3 MR. KERR: I only made one copy of the Court's— 
4 the Report and Recommendation of the commissioner on that. 
5 I'd just like to read from that Recommendation, though. It 
6 states that, "It is the finding of this Court that 
7 Harrington Trucking, Inc. has shown all of the requirements 
8 for setting aside default judgment under Rule 60(b)." 
9 Then it specifically mentions certain things. I'm 
10 reading from paragraph A. "Specifically, Harrington 
11 Trucking has shown that this motion to set aside was 
12 timely." 
13 I actually went down and printed out a copy of the 
14 docket from the day,. the 28th, when we filed our motion. I 
15 think it's interesting to note that on the docket from this 
16 Court, 10-28-98 filed Answer to Verified Petition for 
17 Judicial Declaration. There was also a memorandum to 
18 support a motion to set aside default. The default 
19 certificate is actually entered in after. So that's how 
20 J timely we were. We got our motion and our Answer in 
21 before— I assume— I presume that the dates and the order 
22 has some relevance to when they actually received it down at 
23 the clerk's office. We actually got ours in before the 
24 petitioner got their default certificate filed with the 
25 clerk. On the same day, that's how timely it was. 
1 Second, we've shown that it was because of 
2 excusable neglect. The abbreviated discovery schedule made 
3 it understandable, at the very least, as to why someone 
4 would forget to file the answer. 
5 And finally, Harrington Trucking has shown that 
6 I there is a meritorious defense to this lawsuit. We've 
7 interviewed several witnesses, we have several— we've 
8 obtained documents for discovery which question the validity 
9 of this marriage. Therefore, there is clearly a meritorious 
10 defense here. 
11 I!d like to back up a little bit and talk about 
12 what happened when we filed our motion to set aside. I 
13 personally brought that motion here to the court. I 
14 personally filed it with the clerk. I personally took 
15 copies and brought them to Judge Stirba. Judge Stirba, at 
16 that time, had already left due to her incapacity. I talked 
17 to her clerk. Her clerk informed me that it was being sent 
18 down to Commissioner Arnett. I said, Why, you know, 
19 shouldn't this be heard before a Judge? She said, No, I 
20 believe this should go down to Commissioner Arnett. He has 
21 the file, I don't have it anymore, you can't give me 
22 anything. 
23 I walked to Commissioner Arnettfs office. I filed 
24 a courtesy copy with Commissioner Arnett of the motion to 
25 set aside default. I looked at his calendar. Initially, 
1 there was a date on December 4th of this year, but that was 
2 the first one. So, again, that's after November 12th. 
3 However, there was scheduling difficulty and I had to click 
4 it back to December 16th. But, again, I did it as soon as I 
5 could because I realized that we needed to get this resolved 
6 as soon as possible. I was not— and I can say this based 
7 on my own personal knowledge of what I actually did. I did 
8 I it as quickly as I could. 
9 Now, as to the issue of the November 12th hearing, 
10 we were ready and wanted to go forward on November 12th. We 
11 were prepared to go forward on November 12th. We were 
12 going, we had everything lined up. However, the defendant— 
13 I'm sorry. The petitioner decided to file this motion to 
14 set aside default judgement. I don't know— 
15 MR. MCINTYRE: Wait a minute. Who filed the 
16 motion to set aside? 
17 MR. KERR: I'm sorry. The default judgement. The 
18 petitioner filed for a default judgment. 
19 THE COURT: That was in October. 
20 MR. KERR: That was in October, on the 28th of 
21 October. I— I think that the argument can certainly be 
22 made that that is what led to this problem. We didnft— we 
23 didn't decide to file the default judgement— or default 
24 stipli (sic), they did. And given— they should have 
25 realized, I think, that given the short period of time that 
1 we had, that we were going to file a motion for excusable 
2 neglect. And that for whatever reason, they didn't really 
3 want to go forward with this November 12th hearing on the 
4 merits. 
5 I think thatfs important because the Supreme Court 
6 has stated very clearly that the presumption should be in 
7 favor of hearing a case on the merits. I'd just like to 
8 read a brief statement from the Supreme Court on this issue. 
9 This is in the case of— this is in the briefs, by the way. 
10 Itfs Interstate Excavating, Inc. vs. Angola Development, 611 
11 P 2nd, 369 Utah, 1980. 
12 The Supreme Court states, "Where there is doubt 
13 about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt 
14 should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end that 
15 each party may have an opportunity to present his side of 
16 the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance 
17 I with law and justice." 
18 J We are willing to go forward anytime the Court 
19 wants to between now and the 29th, if that!s an issue. 
20 I We've also stated that this one-year time limitation— and 
21 I'll state it here again— I don't know if it's 
22 jurisdictional or if it's in the matter of the statute of 
23 limitations, which can be waived. We will not bring it up 
24 as an affirmative defense if we decide to have the hearing 
25 in January, for example. I've checked with that, with our 
1 client, and they're fine with that. We are willing to go 
2 forward at any time on the merits of this action, because we 
3 believe that the merits will clearly show that Ms. Robins 
4 was not the common law spouse of Mr. Mitchell. 
5 THE COURT: Tell me, why does this proceeding 
6 matter to your client, as opposed to challenging this in 
7 another action. 
8 MR. KERR: We can!t challenge it in another 
9 action. 
10 THE COURT: Well, you canft challenge her 
11 marriage. But whether she!s married or not, isn't that 
12 between her and her family? 
13 MR. KERR: Well, we weren't going to until some 
14 certain information came to light. Okay. Some of the other 
15 heirs came to us. By the way, there!s already an action 
16 filed, a wrongful death action, by certain heirs of 
17 Mr. Mitchell. Certain of those heirs came to us and stated 
18 that Mr. Mitchell was never married to Ms. Robins. 
19 THE COURT: Even so, isn't that the prerogative of 
20 the heirs to come to this action instead of you come on 
21 behalf of them? 
22 MR. KERR: I donft why they didn't. But also, 
23 this really is a matter of— on the motion to intervene. 
24 THE COURT: And it's been granted. I'm just 
25 asking what this is based on. 
1 MR. KERR: Oh, why are we doing it? We don't 
2 believe Ms. Mitchell— or Ms. Robins is an heir. And if she 
3 isn't an heir, she's not entitled to recovery under the 
4 wrongful death statute. 
5 THE COURT: Yes. But I'm saying, isn't that 
6 really a matter for another date? 
7 MR. KERR: This is the only day that we can bring 
8 I it. That issue can only be brought in this proceeding. 
9 THE COURT: She's not a party to the wrongful 
10 death petition. 
11 MR. KERR: That's right. That's why we had to 
12 bring a motion to intervene, which was previously granted. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. KERR: • And I think that was the issue that was 
15 decided. Really, we're only here to decide whether or not 
16 J default should be entered. 
17 THE COURT: All right. So you're prepared to try 
18 J this anytime between now and the 28th? 
19 MR. KERR: Anytime that the Court wishes to do so. 
20 THE COURT: How long do you propose this would 
21 take in terms of time? 
22 MR. MCINTYRE: Your Honor, I guess the problem 
23 that I have is that I hadn't anticipated this, but— 
24 THE COURT: I know. But if we were to hear this, 
25 how long— 
1 MR. MCINTYRE: I think it was previously set by 
2 Judge Stirba for a full day, and so I would think it would 
3 take a full day. 
4 MR. KERR: I believe that's — 
5 MR. MCINTYRE: That was her estimation at the 
6 time, that was mine at the time. I mean, I have some 
7 responses to their point. 
8 THE COURT: Ifm not ruling, Ifm just asking. 
9 MR. MCINTYRE: I know. My estimation would be 
10 about a day. 
11 THE COURT: Do you agree, Mr. Kerr? 
12 MR. KERR: I believe that is accurate, yes. 
13 THE COURT: Are you through or did you— 
14 MR. KERR: Yes, unless you have any more 
15 questions. Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: Mr. Mclntyre, do you have a response? 
17 MR. Mclntyre: I do, your Honor. 
18 First of all, the disadvantage. I mean, the 
19 disadvantage is having to try the case on short notice. 
20 I Now, they're saying, Well, that was the reason that our 
21 neglect is excusable was because we had a very short 
22 discovery schedule, but at least they knew about it. And 
23 they had not just the month of the October. I mean, the 
24 hearing was held on September 18th. 
25 Judge Stirba entered an order on September 18th 
1 I that said, If you want to file an answer, do it within-- and 
2 I believe it was 40 days. Not the normal 20 that you get to 
3 answer a complaint, they had more than enough time to file 
4 an answer. They didn!t do it. I suspect that if we hadn't 
5 filed a motion, and we filed our motion and sent them a copy 
6 of it way before the time they filed their motion to set 
7 aside the judgment. 
8 Now, in terms of heirs who have come to them and 
9 said they objected because Mrs. Mitchell wasn't married to 
10 Mr. Mitchell, every heir that I know of— and I represent 
11 the estate— every heir that I know of signed an affidavit 
12 in support of the petition. So if they've recanted, I'm not 
13 I aware of that. But I just don't know that there is anybody 
14 else. 
15 And at this point, as I say, the prejudice is in 
16 the preparation time and I don't know how we resolve that. 
17 And somebody is going to be prejudiced here. With respect 
18 to whether or not Harrington Trucking is really prejudiced, 
19 J what their claim is is that they will have a more difficult 
20 burden if they chose in the wrongful death case to oppose 
21 the claim made by Mrs. Mitchell as an heir. Mrs. Mitchell 
22 is the personal representative for the estate, she is the 
23 heir under Mr. Mitchell's will. She is his wife under this 
24 declaration. 
25 I Now, if they want to claim that this declaration 
1 of common law marriage was not made after a trial on the 
2 merit, they're entitled to make that argument. So I don't--
3 of the prejudice to either party, the greater prejudice is 
4 to Mrs. Mitchell by setting aside the default, as opposed to 
5 the prejudice that's visited upon Harrington Trucking. 
6 And let's not lose sight of the fact that it's 
7 Harrington Trucking that killed Mrs. Mitchell's husband. 
8 She was in the vehicle to see Dennis Mitchell die. And 
9 they're the ones who are coming into Court saying, Gee, this 
10 Court shouldn't declare the marriage valid. And if we don't 
11 have the hearing before the 29th, the Court may lose the 
12 power to do it. I don't know whether it can be waived or 
13 not. My frank opinion is that our courts— our appellate 
14 courts have ruled that the jurisdictional requirements of 
15 the statute may not be waived. 
16 And I just feel very uncomfortable being put in a 
17 position where I have to try a case on such extremely short 
18 notice, without time to prepare, or I have to sacrifice the 
19 interests of other clients. I'm put into a position— I'm 
20 in a two-man law office. I don't have somebody that can 
21 come in and help me out to a great deal because my partner 
22 is as busy as I am. I've got trials that are scheduled— I 
23 mean, contested divorce matters in front of Judge Iwasaki 
24 next week. I had planned to use today or even right as soon 
25 as this hearing was over, I planned to use that as part of 
1 my prep time because Ifve got other transcripts. 
2 So I!m in a real disadvantage and it's a real 
3 disadvantage. Not only that, Ifve gone from a position-- or 
4 my client has gone from a position where she has a judicial 
5 declaration that her marriage was valid, to a position where 
6 she has the burden of proof, if this judgment is set aside. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. 
8 MR. KERR: Your Honor, could I make two quick 
9 points? 
10 THE COURT: Briefly. 
11 MR. KERR: First, the discovery cutoff for this 
12 matter was actually on November 19th, which was before the 
13 date the petitioner filed the default judgment. So all the 
14 preparation should have, for the large part, been completed. 
15 Second, they stated that we can always oppose the 
16 finding of this Court in a later proceeding. That's really 
17 not true. We'll be barred by a collateral estoppel. This 
18 is the proper forum to make a final determination of the 
19 status of Ms. Robins1 relationship with Mr. Mitchell. 
20 MR. MCINTYRE: Your Honor, that's just not true. 
21 The discovery cutoff was October 19th. We mailed on October 
22 27th the default. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. The Court is ready to order, if 
24 you're ready to hear. And it's the— I'd like you to know, 
25 I don't know if this is going to matter on any of the order, 
1 but, again, that we did go through the file. I read the 
2 file and I know what!s in it and I know the history. I 
3 appreciate your background. 
4 But the order of the Court will be to reverse the 
5 recommendation of finding of the commissioner for the 
6 following reasons and reinstate the default judgment against 
7 the intervenor— and tell me the trucking company. Ifm 
8 sorry. 
9 MR. KERR: Harrington Trucking. 
10 THE COURT: — Harrington Trucking, for the 
11 following reasons. The Court's order previously ordered 
12 Harrington Trucking to file an answer if they were going to 
13 answer, by— and help me with the dates. October— 
14 MR. KERR: October 22nd, I believe. 
15 THE COURT: October 22nd, which was 41 days from 
16 the time of the entry of the order. The order did— also 
17 set an abbreviated discovery schedule. And based on that, 
18 because of both of those items, the additional length of 
19 time granted to answer and the shortened discovery schedule 
20 should have— did not give Harrington Trucking excusable 
21 neglect. If anything, it should have put them on more 
22 notice, on a heightened notice, that they were to answer 
23 because of the specificity of the order. It may have been 
24 timely and there may be cause, but it was not based on 
25 excusable neglect. 
1 Also, the provisions of Rule 6C (b) do address the 
2 issue of prejudice. And because of the jurisdictional 
3 nature of the statute, which says that this common law 
4 marriage must be established within one year, that time is 
5 running. And because of the schedule of the Court and the 
6 schedule of the counsel, that cannot be compiled with 
7 without undue hardship and prejudice to the petitioner at 
8 this point, and because other avenues exist. Because this 
9 may have an impact, is what Harrington Trucking stated in 
10 its petition— its objection to its petition and into its 
11 answer. It may have an adverse effect is not sufficient 
12 grounds to outweigh the prejudice, the actual prejudice that 
13 will be sustained by the petitioner in this action 
14 Do you need anything further? 
15 MR. MCINTYRE: No. Thank you, your Honor 
16 MR. KERR: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Will you prepare the order? 
18 MR. KERR: I will, your Honor. Thank you 
19 I oooOooo 
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1
 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3
 MR. WILLIAMS: —for Harrington 
4
 Trucking, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Thank you. The matter 
6
 comes before the Court pursuant to petitioner's objection 
7
 to the commissioner's recommendation. I'm familiar with 
8
 the objection, I read the—the original motion and 
^ memorandum in—in opposition and the commissioner's 
recommendation and the objections and the response to the 
objection, so I feel pretty well informed. And I'm also 
12
 familiar with the White vs. Blair case. 
10 
11 
13 
18 
19 
20 
21 
With that, Mr. Mclntyre, you may proceed. 
14 MR. McINTYRE: Thank you, your Honor. 
15
 I Your Honor, I suppose the—I—I have to 
16
 characterize this as somewhat unusual in terms of the 
17
 I procedure that this comes to the Court. 
I think first and foremost, my understanding 
has always been that when one filed a motion, one needed 
to file a memorandum, so we were in the position, the 
rather unusual position, because Mr. Christensen didn't 
22
 file a memorandum, we had to file a memorandum without 
23
 I having anything to respond to. So, we had to kind of 
24
 guess and in guessing at—at what the reasons were, one 
25
 of the things that we were and continue to be in a 
1
 dilemma about is, What's he claiming? What's the claim 
2
 or what's the defense to the action that Mr. Christensen 
3
 claims or—or excuse me, Harrington Trucking claims. It-
4
 -it just doesn't appear anywhere in his motion or in his 
5
 memorandum or anything else. 
6 He—his motion just simply says, we ought to be 
7
 I allowed to do discovery to find out whether or not we 
believe the petition is well taken or not. Well, I—they 
9
 I should have some basis if the believe it's not well taken 
1
^ I at this point. We're now nine months down the road from 
11
 ' the time the petition was originally filed. It well and 
truly is in default at this point, there's been no 
pleading filed in opposition to it and—and that would 
allow us to get down the road. 
We've filed affidavits from every heir, every 
potential heir that we can think of, indicating that 
17
 these parties were considered to be married. 
18
 I THE COURT: Well, let me—let me go 
back and make sure we're on the same page procedurally. 
MR. McINTYRE: Okay. 
21
 I THE COURT: What is before the Court 
2 2
 I are not the merits of the petition. The—what's before 
the Court is the objection to the commissioner's 
2 4
 I recommendation on the motion to intervene. 
25 I MR. McINTYRE: Correct. But Rule C — 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
19 
20 
9 
10 
11 
1
 Rule 24(C) requires that there be some pleading that's 
p I . . . 
filed with the Court that indicates either a claim or a 
3
 defense or a denial of an averment or something and 
there's nothing, 
^ I So that's—in—in that context, we filed our 
objection. And your Honor, it seems to me that in every 
7
 litigation, there has to be standing, and the Court has 
3
 I ruled that standing to contest a marriage is between the 
parties. 
THE COURT: Well, except the Court 
has recognized that there is standing insofar as other—a 
12
 I third party in the White vs. Blair case, that doesn't 
13
 I seem to be in question. 
14
 ' MR. McINTYRE: Yeah. The—the 
15
 I problem—and—and—and White vs. Blair is a case where 
without allowing a common law wife to intervene, Judge 
17
 I Rokich dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals 
18
 I reversed it. So, it—it's a different kind of a context. 
19
 I I—the problem that we have is we still don't— 
I mean, I—I still have to go back to the same thing and 
I don't mean to be repetitive, but that's where I have to 
be. What is it about this petition that is not 
appropriate in the mind of Harrington Trucking? Now, 
24
 they—they ought to have something that they can allege. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
25 I mean, the parties were capable of 
' contracting, I mean, what part of this marriage is 
2
 impossible and it really does seem—I mean, as a matter 
3
 of policy, it's just horrible to allow someone who has 
4
 killed your husband to come in and contest your marriage, 
5
 I mean, that's just repugnant, 
6
 And you know, I—I understand the dilemma that-
7
 -that—that Harrington Trucking finds itself in, but 
8
 nonetheless, if none of the people who are interested, 
9
 I have a real interest in this marriage have come forward, 
why should Harrington Trucking as a third party be 
allowed to intervene and come forward? 
White vs. Blair isn't an intervention case. 
It's—it's an intervention case— 
14
 | THE COURT: Well— 
15
 I MR. McINTYRE; —only in the opposite 
16
 I sense. It's not that—that the insurance carrier is 
17
 I trying to intervene in the determination of the marriage, 
it's the common law spouse intervening in the accident 
case. Now, that's not the situation that we find here. 
THE COURT: Well, there is no adverse 
party in the matter of the marriage of Mitchell and 
22
 I Mitchell unless there's an intervention. 
23
 MR. McINTYRE: True. Well, there— 
24
 that's true, unless the estate contests it, which is not 
25
 the case in this case. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
18 
19 
20 
21 
10 
11 
1
 THE COURT: Okay. 
2
 I MR. McINTYRE: But the estate would 
normally be— 
4
 I THE COURT: But— 
5
 MR. McINTYRE: —the party who would 
6
 contest, if there was a reason and it—and frankly, as 
7
 far as the estate is concerned, that—that was determined 
8
 and the estate file reflects that Ms. Robins was married 
9
 I to Mr. Mitchell and was the wife and that's what all the 
heirs said in that case, too. 
So, I—I agree, it is a difficult sort of a 
12
 | situation for the Court in the sense that Ms. Mitchell— 
18
 I Mrs. Mitchell is also the personal representative for the 
14
 I Estate of Dennis Mitchell and is not likely to contest 
15
 I her own marriage. 
That being said, I don't know that that gives 
17
 | Harrington Trucking the right to come in, because they 
18
 I killed him and may be liable for doing so, and come in 
19
 I and contest the validity of the marriage. 
20 | THE COURT: What if the—in the 
action, an action against then the driver or the company 
of the truck, in that setting, which is more like White 
24 I MR. McINTYRE: It is. 
25 THE COURT: —then the company moves 
21 
22 
23 
to dismiss based on there being no common law marriage. 
2
 In that case, that would be square with White vs. Blair. 
3
 wouldn't it? 
4
 MR. McINTYRE: That would be. 
5
 THE COURT: All right. And so 
6
 they're entitled to litigate the issue under White vs. 
7
 Blair.. 
8
 MR. McINTYRE: Well, they—they are, 
9
 I if this Court hasn't made a determination based on this 
action. I think if this Court's made a determination, 
they're not going to be allowed to in—if my client 
intervenes, and she fully intends to. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. McINTYRE: So, I mean, I 
1
^ understand the dilemma that they find themselves in. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 It's— 
17
 THE COURT: So it's really a race to 
18
 the courthouse, who files—who can get a determination 
19
 first? In other words, if—if— 
20
 MR. McINTYRE: Well,— 
21
 THE COURT: Doesn't that raise then— 
22
 MR. McINTYRE: —assuming that 
23
 there— 
24 THE COURT: Doesn't that raise the 
25
 procedural issue of, well, let's get a determination on 
the common law marriage first and then, armed with that, 
then intervene or—or file a lawsuit against— 
3
 MR- McINTYRE: Why can't— 
4
 I THE COURT: —whoever it is they 
sued? 
6
 MR. McINTYRE: I mean, assuming that 
7
 I there's no fraud in my client's application and I mean, 
the reason I'm resisting this is not for a lack of 
® I confidence in the merits of the case. I mean, they filed 
1
^ I tax returns in 1987, so I mean it's—I mean jointly; so I 
' mean it's not like we've got that kind of a concern. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. McINTYRE: But if there is fraud, 
14
 I it seems to me at that point, then they can point out 
15
 I there's fraud in the—in the gaining of the order 
16
 ' determining that there was a valid marriage; but we start 
17
 J with the presumption that there's a valid marriage. 
That's basically the difference. 
THE COURT: Now~ 
MR. McINTYRE: So, I guess I—when I 
say they're stuck with the decision this Court makes— 
22
 I THE COURT: Well, there's no marriage 
unless it's determined that there is one. There—there 
has to be— 
12 
13 
18 
19 
20 
21 
23 
24 
2 5
 MR. McINTYRE: That's t r u e . 
8 
1 
2 
3 
4 
THE COURT: —an adjudication for 
there to be a marriage. 
MR. McINTYRE: That's true. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Do you 
5
 have anything else? 
6
 MR. McINTYRE: Other than what's in 
7
 I our—I think we've adequately—adequately briefed it with 
those additions. 
9
 | THE COURT: All right. Thank you, 
10
 ' Mr. Mclntyre. 
11
 I Mr. Williams? 
12
 I MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you, your Honor. 
I'll just make a few points. I believe that 
your Honor has pointed out the problem with this, the 
fact that it seems to be a race to the courthouse. 
If in fact there is a determination by the 
17
 I Court that in fact there was a common law marriage, that 
18
 I has been determined for purposes of the case and it seems 
19
 ' to me that Harrington Trucking wouldn't have the ability 
at that point to—to raise it as a defense. 
We merely want the opportunity to explore, 
through discovery, whether or not there are valid grounds 
for the claim in the petition of common law marriage. 
13 
14 
15 
16 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 This is our opportunity, it seems to us, where the 
25 petition has been filed by the plaintiff in this case and 
10 
1
 clearly, under Chatterton vs. Walker. Rule 24 says that 
2
 instead of requiring applicants to show that they will be 
3
 bound by a judgment in the action, the rule now requires 
4
 applicants to demonstrate only that the depo—that the 
5
 disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, 
6
 impair or impede their ability to protect their 
7
 interests. 
8
 Clearly, our interests in this case would— 
9
 I would be affected if in fact there is a determination of 
common law marriage, where that creates a right of action 
11
 I in Mrs. Mitchell and that—that allows her to make a 
12
 I claim under the wrongful death statute. That clearly 
18
 I affects our ability and we merely want to have the right 
to—to do discovery and that's our purpose for 
intervention. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
17
 I Mr. Mclntyre? 
18
 I MR. McINTYRE: Well, your Honor, I 
guess the problem with that whole thing is, Mrs. Mitchell 
20
 I has to intervene in the wrongful death action within one 
21 I year for the date of death, or she's out statutorily. If 
22
 I she's not the wife, she can't do that. 
23
 I THE COURT: And she has to—under 
these circumstances, there has to be an adjudication of a 
14 
15 
16 
24 
25
 common law marriage within one year also. 
10 
3 
10 
11 
1
 I MR. McINTYRE: I—I believe that's 
' true. I mean, I— 
THE COURT: I recall the statute— 
4
 I MR. McINTYRE: Right. 
5
 THE COURT: —saying that. 
6
 MR. McINTYRE: I~I~and so, but I 
7
 mean, Harrington Trucking may be in a dilemma, but by 
8
 this point, they should have been able to do some 
^ I investigation and be able to tell us what it is they 
contest and they haven't filed a single pleading and 
that's required by the rule. 
12
 I And without that, we don't know what they're 
13
 ' contesting here, we're not going to get it done by 
14 I December. This Court's not going to have the opportunity 
15
 I to make an adjudication if it's contested before the 
16
 ' statute of limitations runs and we're stuck. 
THE COURT: You're— 
MR. McINTYRE: And that's what they 
want. I mean— 
THE COURT: You're right about that. 
You're absolutely right about that. And there needs to 
be a—a determination prior to the expiration of one year 
23
 I or then there's the possibility of—of a (inaudible) 
24
 MR. McINTYRE: Correct. And I don't 
25
 know that—that there would be—I mean, I—I think that 
11 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
1
 this Court could make an adjudication that based on the 
^ facts before it, there's a common law marriage and allow 
3
 them the opportunity to contest that if they choose to do 
4
 so in the other suit. 
5 I don't know whether that works or not, but 
6
 that would seem to me to be the thing that ought to be 
7
 done in this case— 
8
 THE COURT: Right. 
9
 I MR. McINTYRE: —because we're just 
sitting here fighting about what—I mean, we don't—we 
just want to get this declaration so we can intervene in 
10 
11 
12
 I the suit. 
13
 i THE COURT: Okay. I understand. 
14
 J Having read the various pleadings and the case 
15
 I to which I've referred and the argu—and based on the 
16
 I arguments of counsel, I'll say first, when I was reading, 
17
 I and this was a new issue to me in terms of an 
intervention in a petition to adjudicate a common law 
marriage. 
And based on the allegations that the insured 
in this case—and—and these are merely allegations in 
this context, drove a truck that killed the—Dennis 
Mitchell, I was very, very troubled by the notion of 
having an—the insurer be able to come in and adjudicate 
or—or contest whether there was a common law marriage. 
12 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
9 
10 
11 
I It—it, you know, at first blush, it strikes you as 
p . 
* ' unseemly and inappropriate, 
3
 However, there is the—for example, the White 
4
 vs. Blair case in which, in that case, the plaintiff and 
^ appellant in that case, was someone who was claiming to 
6
 have had a common law marriage with, I believe it was a 
7
 deceased and—and in that case then, the defendants moved 
8
 I to dismiss him on the ground that there was no common law 
marriage. 
And the Supreme Court reversed the trial court 
in that case and then in the context of the holding 
^
2
 discussed the public, the strong public policy against 
13
 I their having sham common law marriages for the purpose of 
obtaining insurance benefits. And I certainly have no 
idea in this case of—of the quality of the evidence as 
to the common law marriage and I'm certainly not 
17
 I articulating any opinion about that. 
18
 I The—so we have an unusual situation in which 
19
 ' there—there are two ways, evidently, to adjudicate a 
common law marriage, or at least raise the issue and one 
is in defense and one is in the petition. And the—as I 
recall, the common law marriage provisions of the 
statute, there must be an adjudication when one—if 
24
 I there—a common law marriage can be determined either 
25 before the end of the common law marriage or within one 
13 
14 
15 
16 
20 
21 
22 
23 
year after the end of the common law marriage and the end 
being for any reason, separation or divor—or—or—or 
death. 
And so there is—it's clearly incumbent upon 
someone claiming a common law marriage to—to file a 
petition and get an adjudication as quickly as possible 
after someone is—has died. 
By the same token, I don't think that that 
procedure should—can be used to undermine what has been 
recognized in White vs. Blair as an appropriate defense 
by a third party that—as to whether there was a common 
law marriage or not. And for that reason, I think that 
the commissioner was correct in his ruling, that the— 
that the objection should be sustained and I hereby 
sustain—or excuse me, overrule the objection to the 
commissioner's recommendation. 
Also, in reviewing Rule 24, I think, especially 
under the circumstances where a third party wouldn't have 
ready knowledge about—without doing some discovery, 
wouldn't have information about whether there was an 
adjudication or whether there was a common law marriage 
and so some discovery is required. So, I think under 
Rule 24, there is sufficient basis that has been alleged 
under the circumstances for intervention. 
Now, that—there remains the problem, of 
14 
course, about the timing. And when was this petition 
filed, Mr. Mclntyre? 
MR. McINTYRE: Well, the petition was 
filed in February. The death occurred—the wrongful 
C I . . . 
I death statute will expire first. She has to be— 
6
 ' THE COURT: When—when will that 
7
 expire? 
8
 MR. McINTYRE: That will expire in 
9
 | December of this year, the 28th. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm not dealing 
with the wrongful death statute, but I—but that will 
expire when? I mean, when— 
MR. McINTYRE: Well, he—he died on 
the 28th, that would also be the date for this Court, 
1
° J actually, in terms of determining the validity of the 
1
^ ' marriage. 
17
 | THE COURT: What— 
MR. McINTYRE: December 28th, 19— 
THE COURT: December 28th. All 
right. So there's going to be a very shortened discovery 
period for the purpose of this petition. And need to be 
a hearing date set for there to be a determination 
following the—following the discovery period. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
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24 Under the circumstances, it seems to me that 30 
25
 days is sufficient for discovery as to the issue of 
15 
I common law marriage. You'll have to just make this a 
2
 high priority. 
1
 And then—and then there must—at that point, I 
4
 would say an answer to the petition if one is intended to 
5
 I be filed should be filed on or before the 22nd of October 
so you know exactly what any claims are. 6 
7
 And then a hearing needs to be set, and I think 
8 
9 
10 
11
 | time? 
12 
13 
14 
16 
20 
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22 
23 
24 
25 
it should be set in November. 
THE CLERK: November 12th. 
THE COURT: November 12th at what 
THE CLERK: 8:30. 
THE COURT: 8:30. 
THE CLERK: Is 30 minutes— 
15
 THE COURT: May not be, may need to 
be evidentiary. 
17
 I THE CLERK: So you want an 
18
 I evidentiary hearing, not argument? 
19
 I THE COURT: Right. And then, 
depending on what happens, but we'll set aside the day. 
THE CLERK: Well, let me find a 
different day then, that was for argument. 
THE COURT: Okay. I want Mr. 
Williams to prepare an order, let's see, an order just— 
Marcy, we'll just send out a minute entry. 
16 
1
 I THE CLERK: Okay. 
o 
*• ' THE COURT: Overrule the—overruling 
° the objection and I'll sign it. That will constitute the 
order insofar as the commissioner's recommendation is 
° concerned, and also we'll just include in that, these 
discovery cut-off dates. 
7
 I THE CLERK: Okay. 
THE COURT: So what day? 
8 
9
 I THE CLERK: We can still do it on the 
10
 I 12th at 9:30. 
11 
12 
13 
THE COURT: 12th at 9:30, we set 
aside the day for an evidentiary hearing. You'll need to 
present what evidence there is in connection with this 
14
 I common law marriage at that time and divide up your time 
15
 I evenly. All right? 
16
 ' MR. WILLIAMS: So you do want me to 
17
 ( put in the dates of—that you've just mentioned? 
THE COURT: No, you don't have to do 
it after all. I'm going to issue a minute entry order. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Merely—merely the 
overruling of the objection and— 
22
 I THE COURT: Right. And the schedule. 
23
 Okay? 
24
 Will that accommodate your concerns about 
25 timeliness? 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
1
 ' MR. McINTYRE: That will, your Honor. 
2
 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. Don't 
^ ask for a continuance on this, you need to get done what 
4
 you need to do in that time frame. 
5
 All right. Thank you. 
6
 I MR. McINTYRE: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Court's in recess. 
8 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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